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has given us certain commands supernaturally while denying that we are morally bound
to carry them out. This surely cannot be a position Kant intends us to embrace. Kant's
only purpose in mentioning pure rationalism at all seems to be the rhetorical one of
cushioning his evident denial of pure supernaturalism."
6. The Conflict of the Faculties 19110, henceforth cited as CF. See also Critique of Pure
Reason A748-501B776-8.
7. E.g. "What is Orientation in Thinking?" 3011142. Kant goes on to recommend pure
rational belief for practical as well as theoretical reason.
8. E.g. R 94, and the preface to the second edition.
9. CF 77/44, emphasis added.

10. "(Historical belief is) its mere sensible vehicle (for certain people and certain eras),
it is not an essential part of religious faith" (CF 63/37). R 1021111 and other passages like
it can be read as making the point that historical faith can have its special power only as
the vehicle of pure religious faith.
11. CF 75/43.

12. See R. B. Braithwaite, "An Empiricist's View of the Nature of Religious Belief,"
in The Existence of God, edited by John Hick (New York: Macmillan, 1964), p. 246. See
also R. M. Hare, "The Simple Believer" in Religion and Morality, edited by Gene Outka
and John P. Reeder, Jr. (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1973), pp. 406ff.
13. R 135n/126n. At the time when thc very form of the church is dissolved, this so to
speak contingent necessity might cease, see R 126, and 112. Kant makes a similar point
in The End ofAll Things, 338/82. Until that point, Christ "brings to the hearts of his fellow
men their own well-understood wills."
14. CF 115/63.
15. The End of All Things, 338/82.
16. Metaphysics of Morals: The Doctrine of Virtue, 162/486.
17. See R 971105.

The Evidential Force of Religious Experience, by Carolyn Franks Davis.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989. Pp. ix and 268. Cloth, $55.00.

DOUGLAS CHISMAR, Ashland University.
The recurrent interest in the epistemic value of religious experience has
created a need for someone to patiently and systematically sort out the many
different issues, questions, and kinds of data which might be brought to bear
on the topic. Carolyn Franks Davis has done just this in The Evidential Force
of Religious Experience. The work is a presentation of her graduate research
done at Oxford under Basil Mitchell and, later, Richard Swinburne. It is an
excellent piece of philosophical analysis, combining careful conceptual reflection with a review of relevant material from the fields of cognitive and
social psychology.
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Franks Davis is clearly committed to the value of religious experience as
a form of evidence for the truth of theism. "For all the mishandling they have
received, religious experiences are an essential and highly valuable source of
evidence for many religious claims" (p. 250). Much of the book is devoted
to responding to the various attacks upon the epistemic value of religious
experience by Flew, Mackie, Freud, et al. The process of developing responses leads Franks Davis to a cautious statement of the properly limited
epistemic role of appeals to religious experience. Rather than developing an
argument from religious experience, she follows Swinburne and Mitchell by
incorporating the appeal to experience into a larger "cumulative case."
Franks Davis begins with religious language issues, arguing for a form of
"critical realism" regarding the models of metaphors employed in religious
language. Maintaining that "irreducibly metaphorical utterances can themselves state truths about the world" (p. 10), she rejects the view that religious
experience is necessarily ineffable (a belief which might have made this a
very short book). Turning to the sticky question of defining religious experience, she prefers to cast her net widely by defining six aspects or categories
of religious experience: the interpretive (paranormal events), quasi-sensory,
revelatory, regenerative, numinous, and mystical. She makes use of these
categories quite often in the book, recognizing that mystical or ecstatic experiences must be handled differently than the phenomena of everyday religious life.
An important focus of the book is upon the role that interpretation plays
in religious experience. The author argues for an "incorporated interpretation" view which recognizes "interpretation we perform unconsciously to
transform the stimuli with which we are constantly bombarded into intelligible experiences of recognizable concepts" (p. 27). Franks Davis cites the
work of cognitive psychologists such as Jerome Bruner, Leon Festinger, and
Schachter and Singer to show, in response to the "vicious circle" challenge
("the claim that because religious experiences involve interpretation in terms
of religious doctrines, any argument attempting to justify those doctrines by
an appeal to religious experiences must be viciously circular," p. 142), that
interpretation occurs in all perception and thus does not uniquely vitiate the
epistemic value of religious experience. '''Unconscious interpretation' would
only be good grounds for a challenge if it could be shown (i) that the set
which influenced the experience incorporated incorrect rules of inference or
(ii) that the set was of a type which generally leads to misperceptions" (p.
154). Neither appears to be uniformly the case.
The author can thus agree with views such as that of Stephen Katz that all
religious experience inherently involves interpretation: it is impossible to
separate interpretation from "the given." Like Katz, she cites this interpretive
activity as a reason to reject a "perennial philosophy" as well as other shaky
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syntheses of the various kinds of experiences. Yet, surprisingly she ends up,
with Zaehner, Smart, and Underhill, arguing for a "common core," a "broad
theism" which she finds to be present even in such unexpected places as the
Buddhist tradition. Her arguments at this point seemed quite shaky and speculative, often involving a second-guessing of traditional interpretations. A
valuable principle does come forth from this exercise, viz., the tenet that the
evidential force of religious experience varies inversely with the specificity
of the claims it is called upon to support. The "finer points" of working
historical religions must turn elsewhere for support (p. 191).
The real action in the book comes when the author moves to discuss the
various challenges to the epistemic value of religious experience. She notes
that religious experience arguments have tended to suffer from three kinds
of defects: (i) they move too quickly to the Judeo-Christian concept of God,
(ii) not enough attention is given to empirical research and alleged counterexplanations, and (iii) they frequently attempt to base a highly ramified system of beliefs upon fairly narrow lines of argument. Franks Davis is
especially strong in responding to the second defect. She divides the typical
challenges into three categories: description-related (where the subject has
shown poor ability to remember or articulate his experiences), subject-related
(where the subject has been shown to be in a "set" or situation likely to lead
to unveridical experiences), and object-related (where background evidence
causes us to regard it as improbable that the object of the experience has been
veridically perceived).
In a well-documented chapter, "The Reductionist Challenge," the author
sorts through research from cognitive psychology and attribution theory in
order to respond to a whole series of alleged counter-explanations of religious
experience, such as hypersuggestibility, deprivation, sexual frustration,
drugs, dreams and hallucinations, the operation of defense mechanisms, regression, cognitive need, maladjustment (and, in general, mental illness), and
natural histories of religion. I found especially lucid her comments about the
difficulties involved in isolating "religious" individuals or behavior for study,
a problem which appears to cause some damaging biases in experimental
design. Readers who have followed philosophical debate about religious experience while not keeping up with the empirical studies of religious behavior
will find this section especially rewarding.
There are two positive aspects of Franks Davis' discussion which I would
have preferred that she carry further. First, she repeatedly warns that a religious experience argument can do little on its own. Since religious experience
is linked with "a complex pattern of cognitive, perceptual, and personal
factors ... any argument which does it justice must take that complexity into
account" (p. 4). Following Swinburne and Mitchell, the author proposes a
"cumulative case" approach to arguing for theism. In a complex interplay,
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the appeal to religious experience is made more plausible (or "probable,"
following Swinburne) by traditional arguments for the existence of God, but
is rendered less plausible by such lingering difficulties as the problem of evil
or the atrocities committed by religious people. It seems to me to be quite
realistic that one's view of the status of religious experience should be influenced in this way by broader philosophical issues surrounding theism. One
wishes here, as in Mitchell's writings, for a closer definition of a successful
"cumulative case." The complexity which gives rise to the notion of a cumulative case seems also to leave it an elusive concept, definable only by equally
hazy illustrations.
Secondly, Franks Davis offers a novel application of the "cumulative case"
concept by acknowledging that non-theists may also seek to build "cumulative challenges" against religious experience. Unresolved philosophical difficulties with theism in general may render probable naturalistic
interpretations of religious experience where such interpretations would not
normally, in themselves, be conclusive. Since Franks Davis believes that
Swinburne et al. have done a satisfactory job of responding to these background objections to theism, she concludes that there is no reason to prefer
these dubitable naturalistic counter-explanations. In fact, in line with Swinburne's "principle of credulity," religious interpretations should be preferred
until naturalistic explanations can be found for all alleged religious experiences, something Franks Davis believes cannot be achieved.
In arriving at this conclusion, however, I believe the author glosses over
another important form of the cumulative challenge. This is what I would call
the "cumulative counter-explanation" challenge, which holds that given any
religious experience Z, and a record of successes in reducing individual
religious experiences in the past, it is probable that Z can be naturalistically
defeated by either challenge A or B or C, etc. To her credit, Franks Davis
seeks to avoid the simplistic (and all too common) reply to reductionist
challenges that since no one counter-explanation fits all the cases of religious
experience, some such experiences must have evidential force. Yet she never
really acknowledges the cumulative effect that successful reductions may
have upon the skeptic's attitude toward the remaining experiences.
On two separate occasions the author attempts a brief but unsatisfying
response to this challenge. First, she argues that the sheer number of alternative available pathological explanations does not increase the probability that
all cases of religious experience can be counter-explained:
Although none of the four types of 'pathological' reductionist challenge has
wide application to religious experience, it might be objected that if they
were combined, most religious experiences would be defeated by at least one
of them, and so the argument from religious experience would fail. The
combined challenge is unlikely to have so much force, however. Pathological
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personality variables tend to be present in clusters (people are often anxious,
insecure, and hypersuggestible, for instance), and many subjects of religious
experience escape all of them; and it is clear that the other types of pathological factors (e.g., hallucinogens), whose presence is much easier to detect,
are absent from the vast majority of cases of religious experience (p. 223).

In other words, the clustering effect limits the evidential force of there being
many pathological forms of reduction. Nor, second, does she believe the
non-pathological forms of counter-explanation have a cumulative force:
Atheists such as J. L. Mackie admit that no natural history of religious
experience so far developed can adequately account for the phenomenon of
religious experience as a whole. He is confident, however, that in combination they could provide 'an adequate and much more economical naturalistic
alternative' to religious explanations, so that even psychologically sound
religious experiences do not escape the reductionist net. But Mackie offers
no such account himself. Presumably the combined theory would have to be
extremely complex ... However, it would still be difficult to show that this
was a complete account. In fact, most theists would agree with Mackie that
each natural history discussed above 'correctly identifies factors which have
contributed to some extent to religion', but that is far from admitting that
together they constitute a highly probable and complete reductionist account
of religion (p. 230).

Mackie, it is alleged, goes beyond the evidence represented by past reductionist successes in claiming that all religious experiences are vulnerable to
reduction.
This response seems too quick and optimistic, however. Unless one places
a tremendous weight upon the principle of credulity, to claim that religious
experience has "evidential force" for others as well as the experiencer is, in
my view, to incur an obligation to at least show that there is not a "trend" of
successful counter-explanation. Otherwise, such a trend would make it probable that the remaining experiences can be reduced just like the others have
been. That is, successful religious counter-explanations may have a cumulative effect, at least in terms of affecting the plausibility of believing that some
religious experiences will survive reduction. Franks Davis is to be praised
for drawing attention to the complexity of these appraisals; perhaps her book
will serve as a stepping stone to a full response to the cumulative counterexplanation challenge.

Transforming Vision: Imagination and Will in Kierkegaardian Faith, by M.
Jamie Ferreira. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991. Pp. 168. $39.95 (cloth).
CAROLINE J. SIMON, Hope College.
Professor M. Jamie Ferreira's Transforming Vision: Imagination and Will in
Kierkegaardian Faith brings an impressive array of resources to bear on the

